### JASTA

#### JASTA is being blocked now but lots of votes are up in the air --- Obama’s capital is key to prevent bill passage that would collapse US/Saudi relations.

RT, 4/21/2016. “Obama and GOP show ‘rare’ alliance over 9/11 bill that could harm US-Saudi ties,” Russia Today, <https://www.rt.com/usa/340437-obama-gop-saudi-bill/>.

A bipartisan Senate bill that would allow the families of 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia over suspected links to terrorists appears to have made strange bedfellows of President Obama and Senate Republicans, who have united against the legislation. As the bill’s fate hangs in the balance, Capitol Hill lawmakers across party lines are divided on whether to advance the legislation. If passed, it could jeopardize relations between Washington and Riyadh, one of the US’s closest allies in the Middle East. Passed in the Senate Judiciary Committee in January, the bipartisan “Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act” would strip immunity from foreign governments in cases “arising from a terrorist attack that kills an American on American soil.” Senators John Cornyn (R-Texas) and Chuck Schumer (D-New York) are the original co-sponsors. Senators Al Franken (D-Minnesota) and Ted Cruz (R-Texas) have also signed on in support. However, it’s unclear when – if ever – it will come to a vote in the Senate or the House. It is currently being blocked by an anonymous senator, a move that would require a minimum of 60 senate votes to overcome. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) has said that no vote has been scheduled yet. Keeping the legislation in limbo works to President Obama’s advantage, as he opposes the bill, like many of his unlikely allies – Republicans in both the House and Senate. The White House has been lobbying against the proposal despite widespread support among the president’s fellow Democrats in the Senate. By contrast, the division appears to have created rare unity between Obama and some of his staunchest opponents, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) and House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wisconsin), both of whom have publicly expressed skepticism over the bill. “We are obviously gratified that there are other Republicans that have taken a close look at this legislation and recognized the serious unintended consequences that could result from its passage,” White House press secretary Josh Earnest said on Tuesday, admitting that alliances with GOP members are “rare.” Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nevada) told reporters that he supports the bill like “almost everyone in the [Democratic] caucus,” but that the “pushback is coming from the Republicans.” “I’ve spoken with the White House… they don’t particularly like it, but that’s okay,” Reid added. The White House maintains that it would be “unwise” for the Senate to pass the legislation, which “does open up the United States to a unique degree of risk, and putting our country, our taxpayers, our service members and our diplomats in legal jeopardy in that way is contrary to our interests.” On Tuesday, Senator Graham, who has put a hold on the bill, publicly expressed his doubts, saying that he wants to “make sure that anything we do doesn’t come to bite us.” “Anything we do in this bill can be used against us later. So let's say there’s a situation where you’ve got an American in a consulate or an embassy that’s got their own grudge against a government,” he said. “We want to make sure that we’re not liable for that.” He specifically cited US support for Kurdish YPG fighters in Syria as an example. “We’re helping the YPG Kurds, right?” Graham said. “They’re the cousins of the PKK, which is a terrorist organization in the eyes of the US government and the Turkish government. Well, if they collaborate on an attack inside Turkey, I don’t want to be held liable.” His position has been shared by Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Alabama), who also supports putting the legislation on ice to prevent it from coming to a vote. “Everybody thinks this is the greatest bill since sliced bread,” Sessions said. “But you can have unintended consequences.” Shortly before Earnest made his comments, Speaker Ryan also expressed uncertainty over the controversial law. “I think we need to look at it,” Ryan said at a news conference, while declining to endorse the bill as of yet. “I think we need to review it to make sure we are not making mistakes with our allies and that we’re not catching people in this that shouldn’t be caught up in this.” Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) has also expressed concern that passing the bill could strain relations with the Saudis, pointing out that they had pulled out of the fight against Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) to go after Yemen. “I’m concerned about the implications of taking this action on other activities, including the reaction of the Saudis,” he said. “This president has managed to poison relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia that is unprecedented because of his desire to have some kind of relationship with Iran.” Many top Republicans have refused to either publically support or oppose the legislation, saying that they need more time to think on it. Majority Leader McConnell has said he is “still looking at it.” Originally announced by Schumer and Cornyn in September of 2015, the legislation has recently regained attention, especially in light of a New York Times report claiming that the Saudis have threatened to sell off American assets worth 12 figures if Congress passes the bill.

#### Abuser bans link

Redden 15

Molly Redden is a reporter in Mother Jones' Washington bureau, Chris Christie Is Sitting on a Bill to Seize Guns From Domestic Abusers, Mother Jones, 7-14-15

**Gun rights groups**, which **hold crucial sway in the GOP** nominating contest, have **stridently opposed any laws that bar suspected domestic abusers**, abusers under protective orders, **or** convicted **stalkers from owning guns. The Association of NJ Rifle & Pistol Associations has spoken out against the bill,** claiming that it "fails to distinguish between those who commit actual physical violence, and those who commit non-violent acts, like annoying a spouse, which the law classifies as 'domestic violence' nevertheless." Representatives of that group and another gun rights organization, New Jersey Second Amendment Society, did not respond to requests for comment on the bill awaiting Christie's action.

#### **Deteriorating relations cause Saudi proliferation.**

Guzansky, 15 – scholar at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University and the school of political sciences, Haifa University (Yoel, May. Washington Quarterly Volume 38, Issue 1.)

While a deal with Iran is unlikely to lead Saudi Arabia to immediately launch a full nuclear military program, it may cause the Kingdom to accelerate its nuclear hedging strategy—building up nuclear infrastructure to keep future options open.1 Saudi Arabia declared the foundation of its (civilian) nuclear intentions as early as the conclusion of the December 2006 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) annual summit, and since then has been investigating the use of nuclear technology for a variety of purposes. In 2011, Saudi Arabia announced its ambitious plan to build no fewer than sixteen nuclear power plants at an estimated cost of over $100 billion.2 One of the concerns associated with such civilian programs is that they could **serve as a basis to develop military programs** **should** political circumstances, threat perceptions, and allies’ commitments **change**.3 Moreover, well before any agreement’s conclusion, some of the most senior Saudi princes stated in recent years that if Tehran were granted the “right” to enrich uranium, that would obligate the Kingdom to examine its own nuclear path.4 In other words, Saudi Arabia wants whatever Iran gets: “I think we should insist on having equal rights for everybody, this is part of the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] arrangement,” said Saudi Prince Turki al Faisal, the Kingdom’s powerful former intelligence chief.5 Thus, a major probable consequence of any international deal with Iran was that Saudi Arabia would likely demand equal terms. Although reaching an agreement with Iran on the nuclear issue has probably become the Obama administration’s most important priority in the Middle East, reaching the deal, paradoxically, may actually increase, not lower, the probability of a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race. Whatever the case is, a Saudi civilian nuclear program might be hard to reverse, and a deal might not change its course. At this stage, Saudi Arabia is **far enough** down the road that it is at least committed to a civilian nuclear program. In other words, the cat is out of the bag, or the genie is out of the bottle…choose your cliche´ for a nascent slow-motion Middle Eastern nuclear arms race. Renewed Nuclear Appetite Although public declarations connect renewed Saudi nuclear interest to the increasing demand for energy, there is little doubt that the main motivation behind this trend concerns Iran’s nuclear program. The Saudi civilian nuclear program would provide some form of response to Tehran, even if symbolic, and could serve to increase pressure on the United States to limit concessions with Iran. It is no coincidence that Iran’s determination to keep a nuclear program despite international pressure for more than a decade now has coincided with Saudi Arabia’s renewed efforts to promote both individual and joint GCC projects whose ultimate purpose is to develop nuclear infrastructure and knowledge. In fact, Saudi interest in civilian uses of nuclear research for economic, industrial, and agricultural benefits can be traced all the way back to the 1970s and 1980s, when the Kingdom attempted to pursue an agreement (which ultimately failed) with Kuwait and Qatar in 1978, and when it established the Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) outside Riyadh ten years later.6 At approximately the same time, Saudi Arabia began to monitor its own seismic activity in order to determine suitable sites for nuclear reactors that could both desalinate water and produce electricity.7 Other motivations behind these initial pursuits of nuclear technology could have included Israeli and Iraqi nuclear endeavors, the desire for increased Arab Gulf cooperation, and high oil prices.8 However, there has been a lack of follow-up in this regard. The reasons why are likely connected to the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979, the 1981 bombing of Iraq’s nuclear facilities by Israel, and the significant drop in oil prices in the 1980s. The Kingdom currently has limited nuclear capabilities and does not possess even a research reactor. The Kingdom also concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009. But in doing so, it signed—despite the U.S. request not to do so—an earlier version of the "Small Quantities Protocol” (SQP), which limits the scope of IAEA inspections, and it has yet to accept the 2006 modified SQP adopted by the IAEA. According to the UN watchdog, the original SQP “contains a number of weaknesses, such as the inability of the IAEA to perform verification activities in order to confirm that the State meets the eligibility criteria, and the fact that the State is not required to provide the IAEA with an initial report on all nuclear material which is subject to safeguards.”9 In addition, Saudi Arabia, like Iran, has not yet signed the “Additional Protocol,” which allows for stricter inspections. Nor has it signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, though it has consistently supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East.10 Thus, Saudi Arabia has potentially left the door open for it to pursue further nuclear development. Nuclear Gold Standard Saudi Arabia is not the only country in the GCC to pursue a nuclear program. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), in building up its own program, turned in part to the United States for permission and technical assistance and ultimately signed the “123 Agreement for Peaceful Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation,” (hereafter the 123 Agreement) with Washington in January 2009. It declared the intention of both parties to cooperate on various issues connected to civilian nuclear power, including the exchange of professional personnel, the provision of technical assistance, and the transfer of parts and equipment. One of the major clauses in the 123 Agreement—and the one considered to provide the most protection against any shift from the civilian dimension to the military dimension—prohibits any fuel cycle activities within the UAE. The existence of such a clause, in addition to Abu Dhabi’s commitment to transparency and conformity with IAEA regulations, has assuaged fears in the United States of the UAE weaponizing its nuclear capabilities.11 It has also caused the administration to dub this agreement the “gold standard” for similar possible agreements in the future, wanting it to serve as a model for U.S. nonproliferation efforts.12 Saudi Arabia is the only other GCC state, however, that has advanced its civilian nuclear program, though it still falls short of Abu Dhabi’s. In recent years, the Kingdom has begun preparations for developing nuclear energy for the production of electricity and water desalination, and is expanding its efforts to establish its knowledge on the issue. Most prominently, in 2010, then-King Abdullah established the ‘King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy’ (K.A.CARE), whose responsibilities include coordinating issues of policy, legislation, and research in the nuclear field.13 Like the UAE, its pursuit of nuclear technology is assisted by its considerable financial resources, the lack of environmental or political opposition, and the vast amount of uninhabited land available for the construction of nuclear plants and the disposal of waste. Recently, Saudi Arabia and Argentina, for example, formed a joint venture company, Invania, specifically focused on developing nuclear power, and Riyadh has even signed a Memorandum of Understanding in March 2015 that includes a plan to study the feasibility of building at least two nuclear reactors following a meeting between South Korean president Park Guen-hye and Saudi’s newlycrowned King Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud.14 Nuclear energy is attractive to Saudi Arabia for several reasons. First is desalination: more than 70 percent of Saudi Arabia’s drinking water comes from desalinated seawater, and using nuclear energy for fueling desalination is less expensive than using oil in the long run. Indeed, Saudi Arabia regularly issues statements and corresponding information regarding its increasing need for energy, probably as a means of justifying its nuclear development and emphasizing its non-military characteristics.15 Demand comes from a variety of areas including population growth, a rapidly expanding industrial sector led by the development of petrochemical cities, high demand for air conditioning during the summer months, and heavily subsidized electricity rates. Saudi Arabia generated 292.2 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity in 2013, more than double the electricity generated in 2000. Recent data on its electricity production predict an increase to 120 GW by 2032.16 The desire for alternate sources of energy as a means of protecting the monarch’s oil and preserving it for export—and the contribution such technological achievement can bring to a country’s prestige and identity— cannot be overlooked. The increasing demand for electricity production (predicted to grow by 7–8 percent per year on average)17 has caused the Saudi leadership to recognize the need for alternative sources of energy so that it can reduce domestic consumption. The repercussions of failing to develop alternative sources of energy are serious: the Kingdom consumes over onequarter of its total oil production. This means that on a ‘business as usual’ trajectory Saudi Arabia would become a net oil importer in 2038.18 Diversification of fuels combined with a reduction in local consumption of oil would allow the Kingdom to maintain a large quantity of oil for export. The rationale is simple: it is much more profitable to sell oil and gas to China rather than burn it for power. The Saudi elite cannot easily lower or eliminate fuel subsidies as a means of reducing oil consumption due to fears that such a move would lead to social unrest. Rather, the preferred course is to invest in alternative sources of energy, including the nuclear path. Along with these potential civilian benefits, however, a Saudi nuclear program serves as a response to Iran’s nuclear development, particularly as a means of increasing pressure on the United States to deal more forcibly with Iran on the terms of the nuclear agreement. Saudi Arabia has exerted such pressure through signals, such as in 2011, that it may not relinquish its “right” to enrich uranium, as the UAE did. Saudi Arabia would not give up the pursuit of a civilian nuclear fuel cycle on Saudi territory as long as any agreement with Iran would grant Iran the ability to do so. It would, however, consider other options (such as having a third country to supply enriched uranium to both Iran and Saudi Arabia or get Iran to agree to join a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East) as a means of improving relations with Iran, but any decision in this regard is conditional on Iranian behavior.19 Certainly, prestige and competition are also intertwined in this issue. The Saudis do not want to be ‘one-upped’ by Tehran; it would have been difficult for them to surrender this “right” if Iran did not. This complicates Saudi Arabian attempts to assuage fears that it intends to develop nuclear weapons and to emphasize the peaceful nature of its program.20 Regional Calculations Iran and Saudi Arabia stand on opposite sides of the divide as key regional forces shaping the Middle Eastern landscape. Saudi Arabia has expressed concern that an Iran reintegrated into the region and the international community would give it additional resources to support movements and regimes that oppose U.S. and U.S.–allied interests. Indeed, Iran continues to provide funds and arms to a wide range of movements including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, the embattled government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Iraqi Shiite militias, and rebels in Yemen and Bahrain.21 Saudi alarm over Iranian influence in the Gulf was a major factor in the military intervention by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Bahrain government in March 2011, or when the Kingdom gathered a ten-country coalition of Sunni states to bomb the upstart Iran-backed Shia rebels in Yemen in March 2015.22 Saudi leaders assert that Iran’s policies are part of an expansionist, sectarian agenda aimed at empowering Shia Muslims in the region at the expense of Sunnis.23 Iranian leaders, meanwhile, attribute similarly sectarian motives to their Sunni Saudi counterparts at the expense of Shias.24 Saudi Arabia, the Arabian Peninsula powerhouse, prefers to act behind the scenes in order to rein in Iran’s influence in various theaters, while maintaining proper relations with Iran in public as much as possible. Saudi Arabia realizes that a more assertive policy would place it in an undesirable conflict with Iran. Iran also prefers to publicly maintain proper relations with Saudi Arabia (although several of its actions—including an attempt to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States in 2011 and the 2012 cyberattack against Aramco facilities attributed to Iran—have sharply deviated from this pattern). Before the nuclear interim agreement with Iran was signed in November 2013, Saudi Arabia expressed concern and tried to dissuade the United States from being seduced by the Iranian “sweet rhetoric,” as they put it.25 Before the signing of the agreement, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to London criticized U.S. haste: “we are not going to sit idly by and receive a threat there and not think seriously how we can best defend our country and our region,” the ambassador said, adding, “let’s just leave it there, **all options are available**.”26 One of the Saudi Arabian royal princes noted in an interview with The Wall Street Journal that the United States “is shooting itself in the foot.” This prince, Alwaleed bin Talal, even expressed sympathy for the Israeli position on Iran, saying “for the first time, Saudi Arabian interests and Israel are almost parallel.”27 However, after the interim agreement was signed, the Kingdom welcomed it, albeit unenthusiastically. It also stressed that the agreement represented a first step and that it was necessary to see what actually happens. The Kingdom did not deviate from its tendency to take a moderate and restrained official position as soon as the agreement became a fact. Notable, however, was the statement that the agreement aroused hope “if there was goodwill.”28 Essentially, Saudi Arabia fears that a deal on Iran’s nuclear program could lead to a warming of U.S. relations with Iran, and that a possible nuclear agreement might sap **U.S. desire to confront Tehran as it expands its influence** in Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Sanaa, and elsewhere. The Saudis worry that any deal with Iran would be the opening wedge to a reordering of U.S. alliances in the region, one in which Washington would begin to work on regional issues with the Shiite Iranian state instead of with Sunni Saudi Arabia. U.S.–Saudi Nuclear Cooperation In May 2008, during a visit by then-U.S. President George W. Bush to Riyadh, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding, stipulating that the United States would aid Saudi Arabia in the development of its nuclear capability for medical, industrial, and power generation purposes. The U.S. State Department noted that “Saudi Arabia has stated its intent to rely on international markets for nuclear fuel and to not pursue sensitive nuclear technologies, which stands in direct contrast to the actions of Iran.”29 However, Saudi Arabia’s later statements talking about its “right” to enrich uranium seem to contradict this. Indeed, Gary Samore, the White House’s former top arms control official, said in an interview to The Wall Street Journal that the Obama administration has “been pressing [the Saudis] to agree not to pursue a civilian fuel cycle, but the Saudis refuse.”30 Based on the potential size of the declared civilian program and the wisdom— politically and technologically—of placing its eggs in multiple baskets, Saudi Arabia has exerted effort to diversify its program. Waleed Abulfaraj, K.A.CARE’s Vice President, for example, explained that they see the benefits of diversifying in “terms of job creation, value chain localization, and knowledge transfer.”31 Thus, Riyadh announced reaching nuclear agreements also with Russia, Britain, and China—all designed to improve the Kingdom’s nuclear know-how.32 All have proposed to construct reactors in Saudi Arabia. However, as yet, no agreement concerning the actual construction is known to have been finalized, although the Kingdom estimates construction to begin around 2016 and the first reactor built by 2022. K.A.CARE projects 17.6 GW of nuclear capacity by 2032.33 The possible sites for these reactors include Jubail in the Gulf and Rabuk and Jizan in the Red Sea.34 Members of the Obama administration have been encouraging, in the last couple of years, a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, even with some lesser nonproliferation provisions, so as not to disadvantage the U.S. nuclear energy industry. But these negotiations stalled due to Saudi refusal to accept the Obama administration nonproliferation terms.35 Saudi Arabia’s ambitions make it one of the largest potential markets for nuclear-related exports worldwide, an important consideration for the U.S. government.36 In this context, Thomas Countryman, the Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation explained that he was “confident that any civil nuclear cooperation” between the United States and Saudi Arabia “would not in any way contribute” to atomic weapons capabilities.37 The administration is weighing this approach against the powerful arguments of nonproliferation advocates. Since the UAE signed the 123 Agreement, a proliferation-weary Congress has insisted that the “Gold Standard” must be upheld as a model for peaceful technology cooperation with other countries. Complicating matters, any agreement between Iran and the world powers will not only grant Tehran de facto permission to enrich some of its uranium, but bring ongoing U.S.– Saudi negotiations to a standstill. In contrast to the UAE, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to accept Iran’s de facto right to enrich while having to compromise its own “rights.”38 While civilian nuclear development in Saudi Arabia may be a response to Iran’s nuclear development, intended to exert pressure on the United States and/or provide economic benefits, the possibility that it could serve as a cover or a preliminary stage for a military program cannot be ruled out. A series of comments from Riyadh beginning in 2011, for example, have all hinted at the Kingdom’s intention to examine the military nuclear path should the international community fail to prevent Iran from pursuing its nuclear program.39 Perhaps the best evidence of this attitude comes from the late King Abdullah himself. A leaked U.S. cable from 2010 quotes the King at the time as stating that, “if Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.”40 There appear to be two primary rationales behind the nuclear snowball, so to speak, argument: first, the dual-use nature of the technology required for peaceful purposes makes militarization easier, and second, the fact that knowhow needed for civilian programs increases overall knowledge that can then be applied to weapons-related endeavors. Both decrease the expected costs of a military program.41 Further motivations for developing nuclear weapons in general, or shifting to military technology, include the desire for its symbolism— that is, as representations of modernity and technological achievement and advancement—and its contribution to national prestige and identity.42 Based on its history, including the clandestine acquisition of the CSS-2 Chinese missiles in the late 1980s (and perhaps in later years as well),43 the financial assistance extended to Pakistan for its nuclear program and its special relationship with Islamabad,44 the motivations facing the development of a Saudi military nuclear program deserve better scrutiny. The fact is that, despite the security-related arguments as to why Saudi Arabia could choose to pursue military nuclear capability, several impediments exist. First, at present, Saudi Arabia suffers from substantial technical limitations. This makes the development of even a civilian nuclear program difficult and requires the aforementioned agreements with third parties for training and instruction of personnel in relevant skills, as well as the transfer and provision of the necessary equipment and technology. This is compounded by, inter alia, the Kingdom’s underdeveloped educational system, insufficient nuclear-related research, and the need to develop further regulatory legislation and an appropriate safety culture.45 Once these hurdles have been passed, the successful pursuit of a civilian program will itself achieve a number of aims. It will, for example, provide the Kingdom with the desired prestige that accompanies such technological achievement and will place it on par (in respect to the UAE) or ahead of not just Iran, but the rest of its Arab neighbors in the ‘competition’ for a nuclear program. Although these factors have been addressed in connection to a militarized program, a triumphant civilian nuclear program can serve a similar purpose. It would also satisfy Saudi Arabia’s economic goals, specifically those connected to the increased production of electricity and the desire to reduce reliance on oil as its primary energy source. This leaves the **security concern as the primary factor that could motivate Saudi Arabia to pursue a military program.** Even in this regard, and despite the rhetoric expressed by Saudi officials, there are a number of conditions that may prevent it, even under increasingly threatening circumstances and even if Riyadh ultimately developed a sufficient amount of technological know-how. The first is the pressure that the United States will certainly exert to prevent Saudi Arabia from acquiring a nuclear capability, even after the United States and Iran conclude a final agreement. At this point, the Kingdom would likely have to choose between pursuing its own underdeveloped deterrence strategy or utilizing the U.S. security guarantee. In addition, Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the NPT and subject to the norms that accompany its membership in the international community. Although it has certainly engaged in covert behavior in the past— the aforementioned acquisition of the Chinese missiles is probably the best example—its behavior generally does not suggest any interest in blatantly defying international treaties or inviting sanctions, whether they be political or economic. However, particularly **if Saudi Arabia determines that the U.S. security umbrella is questionable, there is no guarantee that it will refrain from pursuing its own nuclear weapons program** should Iran successfully acquire nuclear weapons capability, thereby altering the regional balance of power.46 The fact is that, if the Saudi leadership perceives that its essential security interests are threatened and its stability endangered, it may decide that **prompt action is the best possible course to minimize risks and ensure the continuity of its rule**. A U.S. Congressional report on this topic points out that the Kingdom “**will not hesitate to aggressively bypass or risk alienating the United States in order to protect Saudi interest**s.”47 Considering its current lack of technological knowledge, this has the potential to turn Saudi Arabia into the first state in the nuclear club to acquire nuclear capability rather than develop it. Under the present circumstances, Saudi Arabia doesn’t yet have the technological capabilities or knowledge to independently develop a civilian nuclear program, let alone a military one. It remains publicly committed to the peaceful pursuit of nuclear technology, particularly as a means of assisting in its energy production, reiterates the importance of adhering to the NPT, and repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. None of these factors, however, guarantee that, in the face of increasing security threats connected to Iranian proliferation, Saudi Arabia would not attempt to shift its future civilian program to a military one, or attempt to acquire nuclear weapons from somewhere else as a means of deterrence. Saudi Arabia is working to develop a fully functioning civilian nuclear program. Its motivations stem from considerations of prestige, energy concerns, and as an answer to the threat emanating from Iran. Although Iran’s nuclear pursuit is likely the primary impetus, it is not the only one, and any conclusion to the Iranian question is not likely to reverse such endeavor. From Iran’s nuclear program to Syria’s future, the late Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, who initiated the nuclear program, found himself at odds with a U.S. administration run by a president he didn’t fully trust (in Obama) and carrying out policies he firmly opposed.48 Abdullah’s death, however, and the ascension of his half-brother, Salman, will not alter core Saudi strategic interests. In other words, the change of leadership doesn’t matter—the nuclear program is a national one that has broad consensus. Salman indicated in a speech just hours after he became King that he would continue adhering to the correct policies that Saudi Arabia has followed since its establishment. At the same time, he reportedly urged President Obama in their meeting in January 2015 “not to let Iran get the bomb.”49 Due to energy-related issues, matters of prestige and identity, and serious concerns regarding Iran, the attractiveness of civilian nuclear programs in the Gulf has continued, despite the Fukushima disaster in March 2011 that turned many nations away from nuclear energy altogether. The Gulf is also deemed to be the region most likely to experience nuclear proliferation, as the interconnected considerations (including the strained relationship with the United States and regional instability as a result of the turmoil in the region) alter the nuclear policies of Saudi Arabia.50 Although past predictions concerning Middle East proliferation have proven incorrect, the conclusion of a final agreement with Iran essentially giving it the right to enrich means that the possibility of Saudi Arabia heading down the same path cannot be overlooked. Due to balance of power and sectarian considerations, it is one of the states that feels most strongly about the Iranian threat. The United States and other international powers will certainly exert significant pressure on Riyadh, and the provisions of the NPT will loom large— **but the perception of the U**nited **S**tates **as an unreliable ally** and the threat to Saudi survival **may convince Saudi** Arabia **that it prefers to pursue its own method of deterrence**—in the long term either through a shift from the civilian to a nuclear weapons program, or **in the short term by acquiring its own nuclear deterrent**, or by forming an alliance with another existing nuclear power that could offer protection.

#### Global nuclear war—miscalc and escalation likely

Edelman, 11 (Jan/Feb, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

### T

#### The aff must defend banning handguns for everyone within the actor’s jurisdiction. They may not defend banning handguns for a specific group of people.

#### Definitional support,

#### 1: DC v Heller proves

Scalia 8, (JUSTICE SCALIA, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, “DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL. v. HELLER CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,” No. 07–290. Argued March 18, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008, [http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/07-290.pdf](http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/07-290.pdf//BE&FT&CC))

District of Columbia [D.C] law bans handgun possession by making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of handguns; provides separately that no person may carry an unlicensed handgun, but authorizes the police chief to issue 1-year licenses; and requires residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. Respondent Heller, a D. C. special policeman, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He filed this suit seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms in the home. The District Court dismissed the suit, but the D. C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms and that the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right.

#### Prohibition proves

Jacobs 02

[James B. Jacobs, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger Professor of Constitutional Law and the Courts Director, Center for Research in Crime and Justice @ NYU Law, “Can Gun Control Work?” 2002. Can Gun Control Work? James B. Jacobs OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS] [[Premier](http://www.premierdebate.com), [Premier Debate Today](http://www.premierdebatetoday.com), [Sign-Up Now](http://www.premierdebate.com/apply/)]

**Who would enforce handgun disarmament** and with what degree of vigor? National Alcohol Prohibition was enforced by a small number of US. Treasury Department agents and by state and local police departments. Criminal justice and organized crime scholar Humbert S. Nelli writes that “**Prohibition** **overburdened the [CJS] criminal justice system** and undermined respect for the nation’s law.” Another author recalled that “**organization and methods . . . were hopelessly inadequate.**”20 Professor McBain of Co- lumbia Law School wrote in 1928 that “the large-liquor drinking public has been indifferent to, if not positively in favor of, the corruption that helps to keep the stimulating stream flowing without interruption . . . the [police] force from the beginning has been thoroughly spoils-ridden.”21 In many cities, the police were contemptuous of alcohol prohibition and did not enforce it; corruption flourished. History has repeated itself with the contemporary drug war. **After the Supreme Court’s decision in Printz, rejecting federal authority to order state and local officials to conduct background checks, National Handgun Prohibition might have to be a completely federal program**.22 **What kind of a federal enforcement agency would be needed to investigate and deter unlawful handgun possession?** Currently, most **illegal handguns are seized as a consequence of street or car stops made by local law en- forcement agents**; a frisk reveals the gun.23 Routine car and street stops are not the province of federal agents, who lack general street-level policing authority and experience. Perhaps BATF could be expanded into a super nationwide street-level police agency with tens of thousands of new agents? Such a move would have to overcome the opposition of the NRA, gun owners, some members of Congress, and others who excoriate BATF agents as “jack-booted minions.”\* It would also have to overcome those who oppose expanding federal power and expending a great deal of fed- eral funds. Undoubtedly, there would be opposition and resistance from fringe elements, who for years have warned of a colossal and despotic federal government. The number of militia groups would probably grow, with the potential for Waco-type standoffs and shootouts.24

#### 2: Private ownership means being owned by an individual

Collins Dictionary n.d.

Pioneers in dictionary publishing since 1819

<http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/private-ownership>

**the fact of being owned by a private individual or organization, rather than by the state or a public body**

#### And it’s a generic. No specific actors,

Debois 15 Danny, extremely qualified author, “Topic Analysis” Victory Briefs, January/February 2016 LD Brief

On the last two topics, I was very receptive to the idea that the resolution was about a principled question about the nature of adolescent rights or how jurors should deal with our imperfect legal system, as opposed to a specific policy proposal. Unfortunately for the people who like to card my topic analyses instead of cutting prep against plans, I do actually think this topic does allow much more room for the aff to run plans. Given that ban generally refers to a legal prohibition, I do think the topic is referring to a state of affairs in which there are laws that seek to end private handgun use. That being said, I do not think this topic requires the aff to defend a plan (especially if they derive offense more from why the U.S. should take a principled stand against handgun ownership as opposed to policy advantages to handgun bans), but I do think this topic permits plans in a way that previous topics have not. There is one instance in which I still think generics apply to this topic. “Private ownership of handguns” seems to be a generic noun, as opposed to referring to handgun ownership for specific agents. Narrowing the topic down to just people on the FBI’s terror watch list1⁶ or domestic violence misdemeanants1⁷ adds a level of specification that means that the aff ’s offense does not prove the topic true.

#### Accuracy comes first-the topicality rule is superior and non uniques your offense.

Nebel 15 Jake Nebel (debate coach his students have won the TOC, NDCA, Glenbrooks, Bronx, Emory, TFA State, and the Harvard Round Robin. As a debater, he won six octos-bid championships and was top speaker at the TOC and ten other major tournaments) “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics by Jake Nebel” VBriefly February 20th 2015 <http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> JW 2/20/15

One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, **topicality** involves two “interpretations.” The first is an interpretation, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it. The second **is a *rule***—namely, that **the aff**irmative **must defend the res**olution.[2](http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/#fn2) If we don’t distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative’s view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see **what is distinctive about** Topicality leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation *of*. By contrast, **the topicality rule**—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—**justifies the semantic approach**. This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: **it would be unfair to expect the neg**ative **to prep**are **against anything other than the res**olution, because **that is the only mutually acceptable basis for prep**aration; **the educational benefits** that are unique to debate **stem from clash** focused **on a proposition determined beforehand**. The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple. Consider the following argument: We ought to debate the resolution. The resolution means X. Therefore, We ought to debate X. The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. **Pragmatic considerations** for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might **show that it would be better** or worse***if* the resolution meant X, but** **sentences do not** in general **mean what it would be best for them to mean**. At best, pragmatic considerations may show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. **They are** (if anything) **reasons to *change* the topic, contrary to the topicality rule**. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for the topicality rule, *not* against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above.

#### Violation –

#### Standards –

#### 1: Ground. There is no ground against this aff. It’s largely undebateable. I lose

#### Case debate – the aff’s so specific there isn’t a single solvency author who goes neg. Turning the case is key so it’s reciprocal. No substitution effect, crime rate or deterrence args go neg on this aff.

#### Disads – we already have a small topic, but your spec makes the aff so tiny we lose major DAs to a ban’s effects on American culture, the CJS, prisons, international perception. There is no big impact anywhere near the aff lit base.

#### Core topic controversy – you moot all the lit about self-defense and 2nd amendment rights since abusers forfeit those rights and it’s offensive to say they should have the right to self-defense in this context. The lit base is totally different since the aff is seen as an IPV bill, not a gun bill,

#### **Woodruff 15:**

“New Bill Targets ‘Boyfriend Loophole’ in Domestic Violence Gun Cases. The Zero Tolerance for Domestic Abusers Act mimics legislation in South Carolina.”, BY CHASE WOODRUFF·July 22, 2015 http://www.thetrace.org/2015/07/congress-domestic-violence-boyfriend-loophole/

In a press conference Wednesday morning, Democrat Congresswoman Debbie Dingell of Michigan and Republican Congressman Robert Dold of Illinois announced **H.R. 3130, the Zero Tolerance for Domestic Abusers Act. The bill,** which is identical to one introduced by Democrat Sen. Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota in 2013, **would close several loopholes in existing law that experts in domestic violence prevention say allow abusers easy access to guns. “I don’t look at this as a gun bill,” said Rep. Dingell in an interview with Bloomberg. “I look at this as a domestic violence bill.” The legislation would close the so-called “boyfriend loophole,” amending current law to include convicted abusers of current or former “dating partners” among those who are prohibited from owning guns under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. It would also prohibit gun ownership by anyone convicted of stalking**.

#### The plan forces the neg into bad state bad Ks and could apply to any aff. There will always be SOME strategy, but there’s a huge imbalance in quality ground.

#### That turns your IPV education key args since we can’t have an effective dialogue about IPV if there’s no ground to discuss it.

#### And topical version of the aff solves- you still get your IPV advantage.

#### 2: Limits. There’s a very high number of possible permutations of people the aff could defend – like surfers in New Jersey plus vegans in Kansas. You can ban handguns from mass shooters, serial killers, rapists, men, white people. Evaluate the predictability of the aff in the abstract. Lots of teams reading it doesn’t mean that it sets a predictable limit on the topic, and it justifies many other ridiculous affs. Solvency advocates don’t check – just because someone defends it in one article somewhere doesn’t make it predictable.

D. Voters. 1. Vote on fairness, debate’s a competitive activity with wins and losses-if the round is skewed towards once debater you can longer test debate skill. 2. Education is a voter since it’s the end goal of debate and provides portable skills-also why schools fund debate in the first place.

Drop the debater on T: 1. Drop the arg is severance from the AC- you can read new args in the 1AR and connect the plan to whole res which is like restarting in the 1AR. 2. Drop the arg discourages me from reading T to check back abuse since I lose speech time, making non-topical affs strategic, 3. I had to spend time reading T to check back abuse- dropping the arg moots a portion of the 1NC.

Competing interps since 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline. Competing interps maximizes fairness and education by fostering good norms for the activity. 2. Reasonability collapses to competing interps-you use an offense-defense paradigm to determine reasonability being good which concedes the authority of competing interps-also means your arguments are infinitely regressive since reasons why reasonability is itself reasonable are circular and illogical.

No RVIs: 1. Topical clash- once theory is initiated we never go back to substance because its unnecessary so no one engages in the topic. 2. Chilling effect- debaters will be scared to read theory for fear of losing to a prepped out counter interp, proliferating abuse.

### CP

#### The USFG should provide monetary incentives to states to ban the private ownership of handguns for individuals convicted of misdemeanor-level stalking crimes as well as for individuals who are convicted of any state or federal misdemeanor that has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a non-cohabitating dating partner

Vainik 08  
Vainik, Jennifer L. JD Candidate, 2008, University of Minnesota “Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives.”  91 Minn. L. Rev. 1113 (2006-2007).  PDF.  MO.

This Note argues that **current approaches to disarming batterers are ineffective** and place women like Teri Lee in grave danger despite victims' earnest efforts to seek protection. Part I explains the gendered nature of domestic violence and explores the negative consequences of making the states primarily responsible for gun violence against women. Part II analyzes how recent **federal attempts to correct the inadequacies of state approaches to gun violence unacceptably fail to establish a consistent, national approach** to disarming batterers. After examining constitutionally permissible uses of federal power to secure state action, Part III concludes that **Congress could more effectively disarm batterers by amending federal laws to include three new provisions**. Specifically, **federal law should provide monetary incentives to the states to enact the federal gun bans as state statutes, fund the creation of locally operated gun units for the purposes of identifying and disarming batterers, and require states to report information about batterers to federal law enforcement authorities**.

#### This a less invasive form of federal action- it’s less likely to ding Obama.

#### Solves better

Vainik 08  
Vainik, Jennifer L. JD Candidate, 2008, University of Minnesota “Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives.”  91 Minn. L. Rev. 1113 (2006-2007).  PDF.  MO.

While the proposed **federal grant program** may not provide a foolproof solution for protecting women from gun violence, it **would substantially improve current approaches** to disarming batterers. Under this solution, **the combined use of federal and state law would avoid the problems of the state sovereignty paradigm while preserving important elements of federalism** doctrine. **Enticing the states** to adopt federal law as a minimum requirement **would rebut the presumption that** domestic **violence is** a private matter **not worthy of national attention**.287 Congress would preserve its historic role in regulating domestic relations by promoting a federal grant program that establishes a uniform, nationwide requirement for disarming batterers. **This solution would also preserve a role for state governments as laboratories**, 288 **giving states freedom to devise creative policy solutions** to address gun violence against women, provided they do not fall below the minimum requirement.

**Net benefit – Local is key to hold judges and prosecutors accountable**  
Vainik 08  
Vainik, Jennifer L. JD Candidate, 2008, University of Minnesota “Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives.”  91 Minn. L. Rev. 1113 (2006-2007).  PDF.  MO.

The **federal grants would** also **diminish the likelihood that judicial and prosecutorial discretion could obfuscate the purpose of the gun bans. By stipulating that judges follow a standard disarmament process, the grants would better enable victim advocates and counsel to discover when a judge strays from the guidelines.** The creation of citizen watchdog groups could increase public oversight of judicial decisions. **Prosecutors might continue to seek plea deals with defendants to avoid going to trial, but the public's increased courtroom observation could stir negative publicity over a local prosecutor's habit of cutting deals with defendants. As a result, the public may refuse to reelect state or county attorneys.** In the face of losing their elected offices, **state or county attorneys may reform prosecutors' practices by limiting a prosecutor's ability to make plea deals or by requiring that plea deals include an order to disarm**.

**Federal statutes lead to plea bargains that allow offenders to keep their guns, circumventing solvency; states alone is key**  
Vainik 08  
Vainik, Jennifer L. JD Candidate, 2008, University of Minnesota “Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives.”  91 Minn. L. Rev. 1113 (2006-2007).  PDF.  MO.

While reliance on the state sovereignty paradigm incapacitates the federal gun bans, the **federal laws** themselves also **impair the states from deterring gun violence and domestic abuse. This dilution of government power occurs because the federal gun bans weaken the ability of the states to prosecute domestic violence crimes.** 199 **Since a defendant faces the possibility of federal sanctions** (and possibly state sanctions as well), **suspected abusers have a compelling reason to refuse a guilty plea to a crime of domestic violence and to contest the issuance of an order for protection**. 200 ¶State prosecutors thus face a dilemma-whether to take the case to trial or to offer the defendant a plea bargain. 201 **Trials are costly both in terms of money and time. In addition, domestic violence cases are often "he said, she said"** situations **and many victims recant or refuse to cooperate, making the cases difficult to prove.** 202 Furthermore, **the stiff penalties that the court may impose on the defendant strengthen the likelihood that he will vigorously defend himself**.203 Due to these inherent limitations, **many prosecutors will hesitate to expend their scarce resources on a trial**. 20 4 ¶Alternatively, prosecutors may opt to modify the criminal charges through plea deals.205 For instance, **to settle** the case and avoid trial, **a prosecutor might change the misdemeanor domestic violence charge to a misdemeanor conviction for "disorderly conduct."**206 This action guarantees the prosecutor a conviction while avoiding the expense of a trial. However, **such a scenario allows prosecutors and defendants to avoid the gun bans entirely. Removing the [IPV] domestic violence misdemeanor conviction-and the corresponding ban on firearms-from the table allows the prosecutor to get an easier conviction while the defendant gets to keep his guns.**207 ¶In addition to undermining **federal law**, plea bargaining also **obstructs state law**. **Instead of using state statutes to punish domestic violence, the prosecutor may forego domestic violence convictions in favor of lesser charges**. 208 **Consequently,** the prosecution does not trigger either federal or state gun bans. As a result, plea bargaining circumvents **both state and federal laws designed to help battered women**.

## Case

### Framework

Your impacts are consequentialist- would logically affect other groups.

Respect for human worth would justify util.

**Cummiskey** Cummiskey, David. “Kantian Consequentiaism.” Ethics 100 (April 1990), University of Chicago. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381810

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing** solely **the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends** any **market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

### Extinction

#### Magnitude first—we must calculate future descendants

Matheny 7 (Jason, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis, Vol 27, No 5)

**Even if extinction events are improbable, the expected values of countermeasures could be large, as they include the value of all future lives. This introduces a discontinuity between** the CEA of **extinction and nonextinction risks.** **Even though the risk to any existing individual of dying in a car crash is much greater than the risk of dying in an asteroid impact, asteroids pose a much greater risk to the existence of future generations** (we are not likely to crash all our cars at once) (Chapman, 2004). **The “death-toll” of an extinction-level asteroid impact is the population of Earth, plus all the descendents of that population who would otherwise have existed if not for the impact. There is thus a discontinuity between risks that threaten 99% of humanity and those that threaten 100%.**

#### Death controls the internal link to every moral value and impact

Jonas 96 (Hans, Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich, “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a **tyranny would still be better than total ruin**; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For **are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom**? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; **By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why?** **Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in** the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, **only temporarily banished from the public realm**. **This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings.** Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive**,** the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. **With that hope**—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—**it** **is** permissible**, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity**. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. **At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human** existence **is a part and before which [hu]man reverently bows,** even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reasonfollow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

# 2NR

### Ev Ethics

A: If debaters claim someone is a solvency advocate, then that person must explicitly advocate for what the debater claims that they advocate for. If they do not, debaters must read the part of the card in which the author modifies the extent to which they believe in the argument. To clarify: if your author says “I think it can be argued that it’s a ban,” you can not just say “it’s a ban.”

B: Call for DeFilippis and Zimring – your card says “banning subsets of the population, uh, I think it can be argued that it's a ban.” But you just highlight the part that says it is a ban.

C:

You distort your evidence –the author modifies their statement by stating that the topicality of the aff is arguable, but **literally everything** can be argued for. They don't state that they personally believe it is a ban, just that debaters can argue that it is, which makes debaters the solvency advocate, not DeFilippis.

Evidence distortion violates intellectual integrity – this is an independent voter, which outweighs.

Torson 13 Adam Torson (Assistant Debate Coach at Harvard-Westlake) “Debate and the Virtue of Intellectual Integrity by Adam Torson.” 24 March 2013. Victory Briefs. http://victorybriefs.com/news/2013/3/debate-and-the-virtue-of-intellectual-integrity-by-adam-torson

Too often in debate, strategy devolves into sophistry. **Debaters utilize** a series of **tactics** designed only to muddy the water, **to obscure a fair evaluation of** the merits of their **arguments** by either judges or opponents. **This includes** the **distortion of evidence**, e.g. by reading cards out of context so as to make it seem that authors using terms differently actually intend the same meaning. It includes evasive or overly ambiguous explanations of arguments, designed to allow debaters to shift their positions in the rebuttals. It includes impossibly dense and blippy analytical frameworks with contingent standards, layers of unreasonable spikes, theory bait, and other tricks hidden throughout. **These tactics are inconsistent with** an ethic of **intellectual integrity.** The rules that we set up to make the debate game intellectually rigorous are exploited to separate us altogether from a meaningful contest of ideas; the tail wags the dog. A student deploying these tactics hopes to win not because he marshals the most compelling argument, but because his opponent makes a superficial error or his judge is too embarrassed to admit that he didn’t properly follow the argument. We hope that the practice of dialectic contestation will help us to challenge or confirm our beliefs on important personal and political questions. **Strategies of** purposeful **obfuscation**, on the other hand, **turn arguments into mere instruments of power** - ways of manipulating the circumstances to contrive a favorable outcome. **These** strategies **are disingenuous approaches to** thinking through **the topic because they are** fundamentally **unrelated to the** residual **quality of the arguments.** That bad arguments could reliably beat good ones should strike us as a very strange outcome in any debate event worthy of the name.

This also means that they **do not have** a solvency advocate, so they do not meet their counterinterp, so I win T.

Do not allow any 2ar arguments about how he “didn’t know” – 1. Competing interpretations means that it’s better to lose when you read miscut evidence so people will be **really careful**, 2. Your initials are in the card, Cameron: **you** made the choice to miscut it. 3. All other questions are verifiable—all of their other metrics are defensive, allow abuse to proliferate, and set worse norms. Letting them jettison out of miscut cards in CX does NOT solve any abuse.

## CP

### Counter Interp

Counter interp: the neg may read a conditional counterplan and the status quo.

1. Real world decision making- rational decision makers have the option of doing nothing as well as something different from the aff- artificially restricting engagement with the aff kills our ability to critically analyze ideas.

2. Ground- one course of action in the NC means I lose if there’s a single take-out like a perm or solvency deficit- the 1AR just gets to dump as much as they want in the 1AR and pick and choose in the 2A- turns back your fairness args since one CP is worse for me.

3. Stratskew- aff gets to pick the area of the debate with framework and advocacy and can prep literally anything- I need multiple advocacies to combat your ability to start the debate out in your favor- that outweighs since aff choice solves back for your fairness objections.

4. Reciprocity- the 1AR gets multiple perms. Neg defends status quo with or without the CP, aff can go for the plan with our without the counterplan. That outweighs since you can make multiple smart perms on the CP, giving you more outs than the neg.

### A2 Fairness Complaints

1. Non unique- if it wasn’t condo I would have read multiple T shells or a sketchy NC.

2. Hard debate is good debate- making strategic decisions increases critical thinking and makes you a smarter person.

3. You bite your own abuse story since any turn I make to your shell isn’t a reason to vote neg, just to reject the theory arg. Your violation is worse since theory is a layer before substance, so if they win their shell independently vote neg.

4. You just have to prove that the aff is a good idea to win.

### A2 Advocacy Skills

1. The neg always advocates the same thing- rejection of the aff.

2. To become qualified advocates we have to check things from multiple angles to ensure that we are passing a good idea.